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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEXT ME, MAYBE?: STATE V. HINTON AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS OVER SENT TEXT
MESSAGES STORED IN ANOTHER’S CELL PHONE

The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization,
have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the
refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that
1
solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual . . . .
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INTRODUCTION
For over eighty years, the United States Supreme Court has analyzed the
Fourth Amendment’s application to telephones.2 Advancing technologies
continue to complicate this analysis, as the Court has recently addressed cell
phone privacy rights in the contexts of workplace privacy3 and GlobalPositioning-System (GPS) tracking.4 The Court has given wide deference,
however, to lower courts in deciding matters pertaining to cell phone privacy.5
Particularly, lower courts have reached conflicting holdings on the issue of
whether police officers can search a person’s cell phone without a warrant.6
The New York Times highlighted the courts’ disagreement over this issue on
the front cover of a November 2012 issue, with one interviewee noting that
courts “can’t even agree if there’s a reasonable expectation of privacy in text
messages that would trigger Fourth Amendment protection.”7
A unique case from the Washington Court of Appeals stands out amidst
the courts wrestling over the Fourth Amendment’s application to cell phones
and text messages. In State v. Hinton, the court analyzed the issue of whether
an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in sent text messages that

2. Katharine M. O’Connor, :o OMG They Searched My Txts: Unraveling the Search and
Seizure of Text Messages, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 685, 686 (2010).
3. See City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624 (2010). While the Court
analyzed the privacy expectations of a pager in Quon, lower courts have interpreted the Quon
holding to encompass all cell phone and text message communications in employment contexts.
See State v. Clampitt, 364 S.W.3d 605, 609–10 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
4. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). While the Court analyzed the
monitoring of a GPS tracking device in Jones, lower courts have applied the analysis to the
monitoring of cell phones with GPS capabilities. See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780
(6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (2013).
5. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629.
6. See Byron Kish, Cell-Phone Searches: Works Like A Computer, Protected Like A
Pager?, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 464–65 (2011) (discussing three approaches courts have
developed to deal with cell phone searches); Jana L. Knott, Is There an App for That?
Reexamining the Doctrine of Search Incident to Lawful Arrest in the Context of Cell Phones, 35
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 445, 451 (2010) (“Although most courts have generally allowed searches
of cell phones incident to lawful arrest, some courts have expressed concern about these
warrantless searches and have invalidated them on several different theories.”); Adam M.
Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell Phone from a Search Incident
to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2011) (stating that over forty courts have addressed the
issue of searches and cell phones in the past few years).
7. Somini Sengupta, Courts Divided Over Searches of Cellphones, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26,
2012, at A1. The interviewee’s comments, however, appear inaccurate according to legal
research. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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are stored in another’s device.8 The majority held that those who send text
messages voluntarily run a risk that their text messages may be received by
other parties, while the dissent asserted that text messaging constitutes a new
mode of communication that challenges old doctrines and deserves Fourth
Amendment protections.9
While the United States Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over
Hinton, the particular federal issue presented in the appellate court case
remains open; therefore, this Note examines how the Court would analyze such
a case.10 While the Court has been reluctant to apply the Fourth Amendment to
emerging technology, lower courts have acknowledged that “the Fourth
Amendment must keep pace with the inexorable march of technological
progress, or its guarantees will wither and perish.”11 Cell phones and text
messages continue to advance, and their roles in society continue to evolve, but
the analysis presented in this Note makes clear that society has formed a
relationship with mobile devices that are too significant to be left unaddressed
by the Court.

8. State v. Hinton, 280 P.3d 476, 478 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d en banc on other
grounds, No. 87663-1, 2014 WL 766680 (Wash. Feb. 27, 2014). Although the Washington State
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision, neither the majority nor the dissent
analyzed the facts of the case under the Fourth Amendment. Hinton, 2014 WL 766680, at *2,
*10. Additionally, the state supreme court recognized that the state constitution is “qualitatively
different from the Fourth Amendment and provides greater protections.” Id. at *2. If the state
constitution was either identical to the Fourth Amendment or provided less protections, then an
analysis of the state supreme court’s decision would be necessary. Because that is not the case,
however, the holding does not apply to the present analysis. Notably, another case accompanies
Hinton with significantly similar facts. State v. Roden, 279 P.3d 461, 463–64 (Wash. Ct. App.
2012), rev’d en banc, No. 87669–0, 2014 WL 766681 (Wash. Feb. 27, 2014). Similarly, however,
the Washington Supreme Court in Roden applied only state law and not federal law. Id.
Additionally, Roden concerned the privacy rights of a text message receiver as opposed to those
of a sender. Id. Therefore, this Note will focus exclusively on the appellate court’s holding in
Hinton.
9. Hinton, 280 P.3d at 482, 490–91 (Van Deren, J., dissenting). Research indicates that in
no other case has a court examined a claimant’s privacy interest in another’s cell phone rather
than in her own.
10. The Washington State Supreme Court expressly decided Hinton on state constitutional
grounds only. Hinton, 2014 WL 766680, at *2. As there is no federal question in the state
supreme court’s decision, the United States Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction. See
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). The United States Supreme Court has recently
granted certiorari of two cases that, like Hinton, involve the constitutionality of cell phone
searches by the police. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82
USLW 3104 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2014) (No. 13–212); People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL
475242, *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), cert. granted in part, 82 USLW 3082 (U.S. Jan. 17,
2014) (No. 13–132). Neither these cases nor any available case law, however, examine the
privacy expectations of text message senders as does Hinton.
11. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010); United States v. Warshak,
631 F.3d 266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010).
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Part I provides a general overview of text messages and courts’ analyses of
them, and Part II presents a summary of the facts and opinions in Hinton. Part
III.A addresses the legality of the text message conversation in Hinton, while
Part III.B focuses on the constitutionality of the first text message sent in that
exchange. Through an exploration of Hinton under various Fourth Amendment
doctrines, the analysis in Parts III.A and III.B indicates the Court’s likely
determination that, while one sending a text message has a legitimate
expectation of privacy under Katz, the third-party doctrine is the likeliest
option of exceptions that would defeat such an expectation. Finally, Part III.C
highlights the technological advancements of text messages since Hinton and
how these changes would likely alter the legal analysis. Specifically, the
increasing popularity of alternative text message providers appears to weaken
the third-party doctrine’s application while invoking the exigent circumstances
doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Cell Phones and Text Messages
1.

Cell Phones

Cell phones constitute “one of the most rapidly growing new technologies
in the world.”12 While fewer than a billion people worldwide owned a cell
phone in 2001, more than five billion people owned one by 2010.13 Cell
phones have become “by far the most popular device among American
adults,”14 as 95% of adults between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four own a
cell phone, and well over half of older adults aged fifty-seven to sixty-five own
a cell phone.15
The more advanced smartphone—“a cell phone with PC-like
functionality”16—has become a worldwide commodity. With origins dating
12. Mikiyasu Hakoama & Shotaro Hakoyama, The Impact of Cell Phone Use on Social
Networking and Development Among College Students, 15 AM. ASS’N OF BEHAV. & SOC. SCI. J.,
Spring 2011, at 1, 2 (citing Jagdish Rebello, Global Wireless Subscriptions Reach 5 Billion, IHS
ISUPPLI MARKET RESEARCH (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.isuppli.com/Mobile-and-Wireless-Com
munications/News/Pages/Global-Wireless-Subscriptions-Reach-5-Billion.aspx). For a brief
history of the development of cell phones, see Bryan Andrew Stillwagon, Bringing an End to
Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 42 GA. L. REV. 1165, 1170–71 (2008).
13. See Hakoama & Hakoyama, supra note 12, at 2.
14. Kathryn Zickuhr, Generations and their Gadgets, PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET &
AM. LIFE PROJECT 2 (Feb. 3, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Gen
erations_and_Gadgets.pdf.
15. Id. at 3.
16. Christian Levis, Smartphone, Dumb Regulations: Mixed Signals in Mobile Privacy, 22
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 191, 193 (2011). Christian notes that smartphones
include iPhones, Blackberries, and Android devices. Id. at 193 n.11.
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back to 1996,17 the smartphone has significantly grown in popularity since the
2007 release of the original iPhone—“the likes of which had not been seen
before in the electronics industry.”18 In May 2011, 35% of American adults
owned a smartphone; by March 2012, smartphone ownership had increased to
46%.19 There are now over one billion smartphones used around the world,
which amounts to one in seven people worldwide owning a smartphone.20
Analysts expect this number to double by 2015.21
As cell phones have become the most popular device in modern society,
people now have a more intimate relationship with their cell phones than with
any other technological device. “No one ever leaves the house these days
without three things: their keys, wallet, and mobile . . . . It is, in short, an
essential lifestyle accessory . . . .”22 People’s preoccupations with cell phones
have distracted them from the road,23 the classroom,24 and the workplace.25

17. Jun Yang, Smartphones in Use Surpass 1 Billion, Will Double by 2015, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 17, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-17/smartphones-in-use-sur
pass-1-billion-will-double-by-2015.html (stating that the Nokia Oyj “introduced the first
‘modern’ smartphone in 1996”).
18. Nick Wingfield, Apple Unveils an iPhone That Is Lighter and More Powerful, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept.13, 2012, at B1.
19. Aaron Smith, 46% of American Adults are Smartphone Owners, PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 2 (Mar. 1, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/
2012/Smartphone%20ownership%202012.pdf. As of May 2013, a majority of American adults
now own a smartphone. Aaron Smith, Smartphone Ownership – 2013 Update, PEW RESEARCH
CTR.’S INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 2 (June 5, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//
Files/Reports/2013/PIP_Smartphone_adoption_ 2013_PDF.pdf.
20. Yang, supra note 17.
21. Id.
22. Anthony Patterson, Digital Youth, Mobile Phones, and Text Messaging: Assessing the
Profound Impact of a Technological Afterthought, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO DIGITAL
CONSUMPTION (Russell W. Belk & Rosa Llamas eds., 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/ab
stract=2047442. “Put simply, cell phones have transformed all aspects of our culture. They
impact society everywhere, from work to pleasure and everything in between.” Stillwagon, supra
note 12, at 1172.
23. See David L. Strayer & Frank A. Drews, Cell-Phone–Induced Driver Distraction, 16
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 128, 128 (2007), available at http://www.psych.utah.
edu/AppliedCognitionLab/cdir489.pdf (“It is now well established that cell-phone use
significantly impairs driving performance.”); Thomas B. Falkner III, Michigan’s Texting Ban:
One Step Forward, Too Many Steps Back, 28 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 121, 128 (2011); Adam M.
Gershowitz, Texting While Driving Meets the Fourth Amendment: Deterring Both Texting and
Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 582–83 (2012).
24. Greg Graham, Cell Phones in Classrooms? No! Students Need to Pay Attention, PBS
(Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2011/09/cell-phones-in-classrooms-no-studentsneed-to-pay-attention264.html.
25. Selectmen Banned from Texting During Meeting, NPR (Feb. 25, 2009, 7:09 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=101135099 (stating that it is illegal to text
during board meetings in Billerica, Massachusetts).
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Moreover, almost half of cell phone users have relied on their cell phones for
entertainment purposes.26
Given this intimate relationship users have with their cell phones, it is not
surprising to find studies indicating that people consider the information stored
on their cell phones to be private.27 Seventy-eight percent of Americans
consider the information on their cell phones to be “at least as private as that
on their home computers.”28 Furthermore, nearly 20% of Americans think their
cell phones hold more private information than do their computers.29 Seventysix percent of Americans think that law enforcement officers should need
permission from a court before searching the cell phone of “a person arrested
on suspicion of committing a crime, if the person does not consent to having
the phone searched.”30 That percentage increased by two points when the
suspect’s phone was password protected.31 Additionally, a study by the Pew
Research Center found that the following has been done to privatize and secure
information on cell phones: 41% of cell phone owners have backed up
information on their cell phones, 32% have cleared browsing and searching
history, and 19% have turned off location tracking features.32 Smartphone
users are even more likely to take these precautions.33 These studies show that

26. Somini Sengupta, One in Three Texters Would Rather Text than Talk, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
20, 2011, 8:25 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/one-in-three-would-rather-textthan-talk (citing a study finding that 42% of cell phone owners use their cell phones “to stave off
boredom”). Cell phones have impacted behavior in less noticeable ways as well. For instance,
75% of U.S. adults have used their cell phones while in a bathroom, while communication and
digital interplay from the bathroom used to be a rarity. Quentin Hardy, The Rise of the Toilet
Texter, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:45 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/the-riseof-the-toilet-texter.
27. Jennifer M. Urban, Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Su Li, Mobile Phones and Privacy 2 (UCBerkeley Sch. of Law BCLT Research Paper, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=21034
05.
28. Id. at 9. Only nineteen percent thought the information on their cell phones was less
private than was the information stored on their computers. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 9–10.
31. Id. at 10–11.
32. Jan Lauren Boyles, Aaron Smith & Mary Madden, Privacy and Data Management on
Mobile Devices, PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, 2 (Sept. 5, 2012),
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_MobilePrivacyManagement.pdf.
Moreover, over half of the teenagers who download apps to their cell phones have avoided apps
due to privacy concerns. Mary Madden, Amanda Lenhardt, Sandra Cortesi & Urs Gasser, Teens
and Mobile Apps Privacy, PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 6 (Aug. 22,
2013), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2013/PIP_Teens%20and%20Mobile%20
Apps%20Privacy.pdf.
33. Boyles, supra note 32, at 8. According to the study, 59% of smartphone owners back up
their information “at least every once in a while,” 50% clear their search or browsing history, and
30% turn off location tracking features. Id. at 8, 13.
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a significant number of cell phone users take steps to protect access to personal
information stored on their cell phones. As smartphone ownership continues to
increase, this trend of mobile protective measures will likely increase as well.
2.

Text Messages

The first text message was sent in 1992.34 In 2000, text messaging was first
offered commercially.35 Commercial text messages were originally sent
through a communication method called Short Message Service (SMS), which
limits messages to 160 characters.36 By 2011, 7.8 trillion SMS messages were
sent worldwide.37 SMS messages are sent through an SMS Center, a cell tower,
and finally the receiving phone.38 The SMS technology causes “the
information in each text message [to be] exposed to the following four places:
(1) the [SMS Center], (2) the service provider’s network, (3) the sender’s
phone or wireless device, and (4) the recipient’s phone or wireless device.”39
The “labeling” information—that is, the “to and from” contact information—is
recorded permanently on the carrier networks, while the content of the text
messages are stored for about two weeks before being removed.40
Texting is an incredibly popular means of communication. Overall, 73% of
American adults that own phones and 95% of young adults (18–29 years) that

34. PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA & GINA STEVENS, TEXT AND MULTIMEDIA MESSAGING:
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, CONG. RES. SERVICE 1 (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RL34632.pdf.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Global Mobile Statistics 2012 Part C: Mobile Marketing, Advertising and Messaging,
MOBITHINKING (June 2012), http://mobithinking.com/mobile-marketing-tools/latest-mobile-stats/
c#mobilemessaging. Advancing technologies have further evolved text messaging. A later
development of messaging, Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) allows cell phone users to
send animations, audio, and video in addition to text via text message. FIGLIOLA & STEVENS,
supra note 34. That advancement has led to the confusing reality that text messages may now
contain audio, images, and videos as well as text. To further complicate matters, the transferal of
text messages is no longer confined to cellular networks. Messages sent from online applications
with instant message capabilities like AIM, MSN, or Google chat can also be received on
smartphones. Steve Kovach, 10 Apps That Will Help You Ditch Your Expensive Texting Plan
Forever, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 29, 2011, 12:41 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/free-textingapps-2011-8?op=1. These technologies allow for text messages to no longer be “only sent as
‘point-to-point’ communications between two mobile device users” but rather across various
devices, as these applications can be accessed by computers as well. FIGLIOLA & STEVENS, supra
note 34.
38. FIGLIOLA & STEVENS, supra note 34.
39. O’Connor, supra note 2, at 689.
40. Matthew E. Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New Frontier of
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 187–88, 199 (2010).
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own phones send and receive text messages.41 In 2008, The New York Times
reported that text message use in the United States had increased more than
tenfold in three years.42 Currently, nearly one third of cell phone owners in the
United States prefer to be contacted by text message rather than by voice call.43
A 2012 Pew Center study showed that teenagers continue to be the leading
texting demographic, with the percentage of teenagers who text daily
increasing from 38% in February 2008 to 54% in September 2009.44 A
different study noted:
[Sixty-three percent] of all teens[, as of 2012,] say they exchange text
messages every day with people in their lives. This far surpasses the frequency
with which they pick other forms of daily communication, including phone
calling by cell phone (39% do that with others every day), face-to-face
socializing outside of school (35%), social network site messaging (29%),
instant messaging (22%), talking on landlines (19%) and emailing (6%).45

Texting, however, is not just a teenage phenomenon. In May 2011, over
forty messages were exchanged daily by adults older than twenty-four, while
over 100 messages are exchanged daily by young adults between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-four.46 Along with taking photos, texting is the most

41. Aaron Smith, Americans and Text Messaging, PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET & AM.
LIFE PROJECT 2–3 (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/
Americans%20and%20Text%20Messaging.pdf. See also Katherine Rosman, Y U Luv Texts, H8
Calls: We Want to Reach Others But Not to Be Interrupted, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 14, 2010, 12:01
AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703673604575550201949192336.html.
42. Jennifer Steinhauer & Laura M. Holson, Cellular Alert: As Texts Fly, Danger Lurks,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at A1.
43. Smith, supra note 41, at 8. While a majority of cell phone owners prefer to be contacted
via phone call, the study found that active “texters” preferred text messages as their mode of
contact. Id.
44. Amanda Lenhart, Rich Ling, Scott Campbell & Kristen Purcell, Teens and Mobile
Phones, PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 2 (Apr. 20, 2010), http://pewin
ternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP-Teens-and-Mobile-2010-with-topline.pdf (stating that
one third of teenagers send more than one hundred text messages a day).
45. Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Smartphones & Texting, PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET &
AM. LIFE PROJECT 2 (Mar. 19, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_
Teens_Smartphones_and_Texting.pdf.
46. Smith, supra note 41, at 2. Additionally, a study cited by The New York Times found that
59% of teenagers reported that their parents text and drive. KJ Dell’Antonia, Teenagers Say
Parents Text and Drive, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2012, 8:27 AM), http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.
com/2012/09/27/teenagers-say-parents-text-and-drive (citing Teens Mirror Parents’ Distracted
Driving Habits in New Liberty Mutual Insurance/SADD Survey, PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/teens-mirror-parents-distracted-driving-habits-innew-liberty-mutual-insurancesadd-survey-169851596.html).
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common application used among cell phone owners.47 Research also supports
the assertion that, with the exception of contact information, text messages are
the most commonly stored information on devices.48 Despite the computer-like
capabilities of smartphones, most smartphone users text more than they email,
play music, or even access the internet.49 The popularity of texting has inspired
various sectors to take advantage of the mode of communication. Stores such
as Bed Bath & Beyond have sent coupons via text message.50 Natural disaster
relief organizations have offered donations via text message.51 Political
campaigns have utilized text messages as a donation-raising tool.52
The rate of SMS texting, however, has begun to decelerate and even
decline in certain parts of the world.53 With the growing popularity of
smartphones with internet capabilities, more users are sending text messages
through alternative online messaging services instead of sending text messages
through cell phone networks.54 Apple’s recent introduction of iMessage—
which runs on iPhones, iPods, iPads, and Macs—allows users to send text

47. Aaron Smith, Americans and their Cell Phones, PEW RESEARCH CTR.’S INTERNET &
AM. LIFE PROJECT 3 (Aug. 15, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/Cell%
20Phones%202011.pdf.
48. Urban et al., supra note 27, at 8.
49. Smith, supra note 47.
50. Lauren Johnson, Bed Bath & Beyond Increases SMS Opt-ins with In-Store Call-toAction, MOBILE COM. DAILY (July 11, 2012, 4:30 AM), http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/
bed-bath-beyond-ramps-up-sms-opt-ins-via-in-store-call-to-action.
51. See Anita Hamilton, Donating by Text: Haiti Fundraising Goes Viral, TIME (Jan. 13,
2010), http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1953379_1953494_195352
8,00.
52. In August of 2012, President Barack Obama became the first presidential candidate to
accept donations via text message. Dan Eggen, Text “GIVE” to Obama: President’s Campaign
Launches Cellphone Donation Drive, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.washington
post.com/politics/text-give-to-obama-presidents-campaign-launches-cellphone-donation-drive/
2012/08/23/5459649a-ecc4-11e1-9ddc-340d5efb1e9c_story.html/. Later that month, rival
candidate Mitt Romney’s campaign also began accepting donations by text message. Dave
Levinthal, Mitt Romney Now Taking Donations via Text, POLITICO (Aug. 31, 2012, 12:53 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0812/80527.html.
53. See Brian X. Chen, The State of Mobile: Less Talking, Fewer Texts, More Data, N.Y.
TIMES (May 2, 2012, 6:16 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/state-of-mobile. Other
popular SMS-alternative services include WhatsApp and Snapchat. See Parmy Olson, RIM
Prepares to Launch New BlackBerry for “The Hyper-Connected”, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2013, 4:49
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2013/01/29/rim-prepares-to-launch-new-blackber
ry-for-the-hyper-connected/.
54. See Chen, supra note 53; Olson, supra note 53. See also Brian X. Chen, Text Messaging
Is in Decline in Some Countries, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2012, 3:27 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.
com/2012/01/01/text-messaging-is-in-decline-in-some-countries.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1118

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1109

messages to other devices through an internet connection.55 Similarly,
Facebook Messenger allows smartphone users with Facebook accounts to send
and receive messages while avoiding carrier charges.56 In November 2012,
texting traffic via cellular carriers declined for the first time due to these
texting alternatives.57 This trend is expected to continue as smartphone
ownership increases.58 As the decline of SMS text messages is a very recent
development, courts have yet to determine whether to distinguish these
alternative text messages from the more traditional SMS text messages.59
B.

The Fourth Amendment Applied to Cell Phones and Text Messages

This section first provides a brief overview of the law on searches and
seizures. After summarizing the ways in which courts analogize cell phones to
the search and seizure framework, this section explores more narrowly the
positions that the courts have taken on the privacy of text messages.
1.

Search and Seizure Overview

The investigatory power of government officials to search and seize an
object or document is governed by the Fourth Amendment.60 Searches must be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and such reasonableness typically
requires obtaining a warrant.61A warrantless search may nevertheless be
reasonable if consent is obtained or various exceptions are met.62 If a
government official violates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights, then such
55. See Jenna Wortham, Is iMessage Starting to Take a Bite Out of Standard Texting?, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012, 4:24 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/is-imessage-startingto-take-a-bite-out-of-sms/.
56. Facebook App Allows Users To Avoid Texting Charges, NPR (Aug. 15, 2011, 3:00 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/08/15/139652111/facebook-app-allows-users-to-avoid-texting-charges.
57. Brian X. Chen, Text Messaging Declines in U.S. for First Time, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 12, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/text-messaging-declinesunited-states/ (last updated Nov. 12, 2012, 3:21 PM). It is important to recognize the headline’s
misleading title. While texting via cellular carriers has declined, texting in the general sense of the
word has not. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Chris Soghoian, US Surveillance Law May Poorly Protect New Text Message
Services, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 8, 2013, 9:44 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/nation
al-security-technology-and-liberty/us-surveillance-law-may-poorly-protect-new-text.
60. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND
TECHNOLOGY 82 (3d ed. 2011). The Fourth Amendment states, in its entirety:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
61. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 60, at 83.
62. Id.
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person can have that evidence suppressed.63 This option is commonly known
as the exclusionary rule.64 Moreover, all other evidence obtained by way of the
illegal search or seizure is also suppressed due to the “fruit of the poisonous
tree” doctrine.65
In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan laid out the nowrecognized test for whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.66
He set up a two-step analysis, whereby a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists if the following elements are met: “first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”67 The Court has
provided a significant guideline for interpreting the Katz test: that the
“legitimation of expectations of privacy” be supported by “reference to
concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society.”68 Furthermore, the Court has since
eliminated the subjective component from its analysis.69 Regarding the
objective component, it bears emphasizing that the test does not address
whether a reasonable person would have that expectation, but rather whether

63. Id. at 86.
64. Id. (stating that the exclusionary rule was established by the Court in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
65. Id. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine indicates that since illegally obtained
evidence (the poisonous tree) must be suppressed, so too must evidence that was “come at by
[the] exploitation of that illegality” (the fruit from the poisonous tree). Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
66. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); SOLOVE &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 60, at 101.
67. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. It is worth noting that some legal commentators assert that the
Katz test serves to determine standing as well as whether a legitimate expectation of privacy
exists. New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 7 N.Y. PRAC. § 10:5 (2d ed. 2013). “[I]n Rakas v.
Illinois, the Supreme Court suggested that the concept of standing was superfluous, and that
standing inquiries could be subsumed in substantive Fourth Amendment analysis.” Id. (citing
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979)). While an appropriate
reading of Rakas, this quotation is misleading. As a passenger of a car in which he had no
possessory interest, the defendant in Rakas had no expectation of privacy in the car’s glove
compartment that was searched. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148–49. While the Rakas Court worded the
question of standing as whether the defendant’s rights were violated, see id. at 137–38, this Note
will use the term “standing” to distinguish it from the Katz test language.
68. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 60, at 101 (quoting Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E.
Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases:
An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727,
731–32 (1993)). See also José Felipé Anderson, Reflections on Standing: Challenges to Searches
and Seizures in a High Technology World, 75 MISS. L.J. 1099, 1116–19 (2006).
69. Christopher R. Jones, “EyePhones”: A Fourth Amendment Inquiry into Mobile Iris
Scanning, 63 S.C. L. REV. 925, 935 (2012) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109
(1984)).
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the expectation was one recognized by society as reasonable.70 The objective
component must therefore “have a source outside the Fourth Amendment,” and
it can be proven by understandings that are recognized in and permitted by
society.71
Even if the search is found to be unlawful and the Katz test is met, there
are still several exceptions under which a party has no expectation of privacy.
Under the misplaced trust doctrine, for example, “people place their trust in
others at their own peril and must assume the risk of [that] betrayal.”72 Under
White, the Court found that one has no reasonable expectation of privacy when
communicating with an undercover officer.73
Another exception to the Katz test is the third-party doctrine. “What a
person knowingly exposes to the public,” asserted the Katz Court, “is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”74 As a result, “one assumes the risk
of exposure . . . in information knowingly revealed to a third party. There is an
implied assumption of the risk in conveying information to a third party so that
it is no longer private.”75
Moreover, a party forfeits any expectation of privacy in the analysis for
communications made by written letters. When analyzing the reasonable
expectation of privacy in a letter, “courts make two distinctions: (1) between
‘envelope’ information and ‘content’ information, and (2) between a letter in
transit and a letter received.”76 While in transit, the Fourth Amendment
protects the content of the letter but not the labeling information available on
the envelope; once received, however, the content of the message is no longer
protected.77 Upon receipt, any expectation of privacy in the content is
relinquished because the recipient can reveal the content to others.78
Finally, exigent circumstances also allow for warrantless searches and
seizures to be lawful.79 Under this exception, the Court recognizes
“exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law
70. Orin Kerr, What Makes an Expectation of Privacy “Reasonable”? A Response to Chief
Justice Roberts, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 13, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/
12/13/what-makes-an-expectation-of-privacy-reasonable-a-response-to-chief-justice-roberts/
(stating that Chief Justice Roberts’s questions during oral arguments illustrate a potential
misunderstanding of this component).
71. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
72. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 60, at 107.
73. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
74. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
75. O’Connor, supra note 2, at 693–94 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44
(1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”)).
76. Id. at 695 (citing Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 735 (1878)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948).
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enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a
magistrate’s warrant for search may be dispensed with.”80 Situations in which
courts typically recognize the exigent circumstances doctrine fall into three
categories: “life-threatening exigencies, hot pursuit, and preservation of
evidence from destruction.”81 “Where there are exigent circumstances in which
police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the
crime,” the Court has found that “it is reasonable to permit action without prior
judicial evaluation.”82
2.

Cell Phone Searches in General

Fourth Amendment applications to cell phones constitute a recent and
contentious issue for courts.83 While not the focus of this Note, the vast
majority of cases discussing cell phone searches do so under the searchincident-to-arrest doctrine.84 Under this doctrine, “police are authorized to
search the person and his immediate ‘grabbing space’ to protect against
physical danger and to prevent the destruction of evidence.”85 Most of the
courts extending the doctrine to cell phone searches have upheld such
searches.86 The Fifth Circuit is the most prominent court to uphold such
searches,87 while the Ohio Supreme Court is the most prominent of the few
courts to reject such searches.88
In addition to upholding that cell phones are searchable incident to arrest, a
number of courts have also justified warrantless searches of cell phones by
way of the exigent circumstances doctrine.89 Courts have applied this doctrine
80. Id.
81. Clifford S. Fishman, Interception of Communications in Exigent Circumstances: The
Fourth Amendment, Federal Legislation, and The United States Department of Justice, 22 GA. L.
REV. 1, 13 (1987).
82. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973).
83. See Orso, supra note 40, at 183–84. See also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
84. Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 1137.
85. Id. at 1131.
86. For a list of cases upholding searches of cell phones incident to arrest, see id. at 1137
n.66. Courts typically include at least one of the following rationales to support this decision: (1)
the search is necessary due to the risk of the destruction of evidence; (2) cell phones are
containers, which may be searched incident to arrest; (3) cell phones are like pagers, which most
courts hold may be searched incident to arrest; and (4) the information stored on cell phones is
like that in wallets or address book, which may be searched incident to arrest. Ashley B. Snyder,
The Fourth Amendment and Warrantless Cell Phone Searches: When is Your Cell Phone
Protected?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 155, 166–67 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
87. Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 1139 (citing United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir.
2007)).
88. Id. at 1140 (citing State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009)). For a list of cases
rejecting searches of cell phones incident to arrest, see id. at 1139 n.76.
89. Snyder, supra note 86, at 173 (citing United States v. Santillan, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1093,
1101 (D. Ariz. 2008); United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1303–04 (D. Kan. 2003)).
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by classifying cell phone searches under the category of preservation of
evidence from destruction.90 The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has rejected
this rationale, noting that such information stored in a cell phone could be
recoverable from cell phone service providers, “which might possibly maintain
such records as part of its normal operating procedures.”91
In courts’ analyses of cell phone privacy, they have also analogized them
to wallets, address books, and diaries; such courts have held that cell phones
contain information similar to these storage devices.92 Since most of today’s
cell phones have applications (or “apps”) containing contact information and
“[since] police are entitled to open a pocket diary to copy the owner’s address,
[police] should [also] be entitled to turn on a cell phone to learn its number.”93
The Seventh Circuit, however, has recognized a distinction between such
“labeling” information and other “content” information that can be highly
private and therefore unsearchable without a warrant.94 Importantly, the
Seventh Circuit recognized the enormous amount of “content” information that
can be stored on a cell phone, emphasizing that “a modern cell phone is a
computer.”95
3.

Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Text Messages

A recent note by Katherine O’Connor, a former editor of the University of
Illinois Law Review who graduated from law school in 2010, presented various
courts’ analyses of Fourth Amendment protections over text messages.96 She
stated that a number of courts have reached a consensus that an individual has
a reasonable expectation of privacy over text messages in one’s own device.97

Furthermore, Snyder asserts that even when courts follow Ohio’s precedent and reject an
extension of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, law enforcement will likely rely on the exigent
circumstances doctrine to search cell phones without a warrant. Id. at 174.
90. See Fishman, supra note 81 and accompanying text.
91. Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 956.
92. See e.g., United States v. Cote, No. 03CR271, 2005 WL 1323343 (N.D. Ill. May 26,
2005), aff’d, 504 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2007). “Searches of items such as wallets and address books,
which I consider analogous to Cote’s cellular phone since they would contain similar information,
have long been held valid when made incident to an arrest.” Id. at *6 (citing United States v.
Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1993)).
93. United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2012).
94. See id.
95. Id. at 804.
96. See O’Connor, supra note 2, at 691.
97. Id. at 703 (citing Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir.
2008), rev’d sub nom., City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010); United States v.
Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007)). O’Connor notes that these courts distinguish between
the phone itself and the actual transmission of information. Id. See also Robin Miller, Annotation,
Expectation of Privacy in Text Transmissions to or from Pager, Cellular Telephone, or Other
Wireless Personal Communications Device, 25 A.L.R.6th 201 (2007). “Where the government
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At the same time, Ms. O’Connor wrote, courts also appear to be in general
agreement that a person sending a text message has no such reasonable
expectation of privacy in content stored in the other’s device.98 The rationale
for this agreement is twofold: (1) the third-party doctrine defeats any claim the
sender has of a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (2) text messages are
analogized to letters, whereby a reasonable expectation of privacy is
relinquished upon delivery.99
Ms. O’Connor asserted that a user would not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy under the third-party doctrine because the sent message “can exist in
various places besides a sender’s phone; for example, in a SMC, in the
recipient’s phone, or as part of the service provider’s temporary or permanent
records.”100 Courts applying the third-party doctrine have held that the sender
knowingly reveals information to these parties.101 Most people, however, do
not fully understand the extent to which, nor the process by which, text
messages are exposed to third parties.102 Ms. O’Connor emphasized that the
Smith dissent recognized this potential lack of knowledge regarding phone
monitoring,103 although the Smith majority held that such subjective
expectations are not legitimate.104 Ms. O’Connor suggested that the rationale in
the Smith dissent is more applicable than the rationale in the majority because
of “[t]he vast amounts of information stored in modern cell phones [that] entail
greater privacy concerns.”105
Additionally, a number of courts have analogized text messages to
letters.106 Under the extension of this analogy, senders lose any reasonable
expectation of privacy upon delivery.107 The advancement of technology,
however, makes this analogy “insufficient and logically inconsistent” for at
least three reasons.108 First, text messages are transmitted in a matter of
seconds, while letters are delivered in a matter of days.109 Consequently, “any

acts in a law enforcement capacity, the courts are in agreement that a person using a . . . cellular
telephone . . . with text messaging capabilities has a reasonable expectation of privacy, against a
search by law enforcement personnel, in text messages received by and stored on the device[.]”
Id. at § 2.
98. See O’Connor, supra note 2, at 703–04.
99. Id. at 703–05.
100. Id. at 704 (internal citation omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 708.
103. O’Connor, supra note 2, at 704 n.148 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 749
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 708–09.
106. Id. at 706.
107. Id. at 707.
108. O’Connor, supra note 2, at 707.
109. Id. at 708.
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reasonable expectation of privacy that existed is obliterated just as quickly as
the message is delivered.”110 Second, text messages are more analogous to
phone calls than letters in significant ways. As telephone booth users seek to
preserve the privacy of their communication by excluding those outside the
booth from “the uninvited ear,” senders of text messages arguably take extra
precaution to preserve such privacy “by avoiding speaking into the mouthpiece
altogether.”111 The visual formatting of text message apps on popular
smartphones furthers this analogy to phone calls because the display of text
messages within speech bubbles reinforces a conversational quality.112 Finally,
as technology evolves, courts should consider not only the sophistication of the
technology but also the way in which people relate to and interact with the
technology. “A user bases her expectation of privacy on how she uses the
technology . . . rather than on the specific technical means used. This
functional view by users lends credence to the idea that society should—and
likely will—recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy for [text
messaging].”113
Despite this analogy, senders of letters have certain privacy protections
that are not extended to senders of text messages.114 For instance, opening a

110. Id.
111. Id. at 713 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–53 (1967)).
112. See Galaxy S III, SAMSUNG.COM, http://www.samsung.com/us/galaxy-s-3-smartphone/
(last visited Feb. 10, 2013) (depicting an image corresponding with the text “Powerful
Performance”); Texting and Messaging, WINDOWSPHONE.COM, http://www.windowsphone.
com/en-us/how-to/wp8/people/messaging (last visited Dec. 26, 2013); Messages, APPLE.COM,
https://www.apple.com/ios/messages/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2013). A similar conversational
element can be found in emails, which courts have analogized to letters for Fourth Amendment
purposes. See Wiltse Carpenter, Turn Off Gmail’s Conversation View, OFFICIAL GMAIL BLOG
(Sept. 29, 2010), http://gmailblog.blogspot.com/2010/09/turn-off-gmails-conversation-view.html;
infra note 156 and accompanying text. This grouping of emails, however, does not have the
“skeumorphism,” or the visual imitation, of conversation like the speech bubble layout of modern
text messages. Moreover, texting is becoming a primary mode of communication, even in the
business context, since cell phones are typically just an arm’s length away and do not require an
internet connection. See Lydia Dishman, Texting is the New Email—Does Your Company Do It
Right?, FAST COMPANY (May 30, 2013, 7:35 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3010237/bot
tom-line/texting-is-the-new-email-does-your-company-do-it-right. The more conversational
quality of texting aligns more closely with telephone communication than email, and texting’s
prominence among teenagers and adults alike furthers its distinction from email, which is a
“practically nonexistent” form of communication for teenagers. Dara Kerr, Teens Prefer Texting
over Phone Calls, E-mail, CNET (Mar. 19, 2012, 8:10 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_357400439-93/teens-prefer-texting-over-phone-calls-e-mail/.
113. John Soma et al., Bit-Wise but Privacy Foolish: Smarter E-Messaging Technologies Call
for a Return to Core Privacy Principles, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 487, 504 (2010) (categorizing
telephone systems, email, text messages, instant messages, and social networking under the
umbrella term of electronic messaging, or “e-messaging”).
114. O’Connor, supra note 2, at 709.
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letter addressed to someone else constitutes a federal offense, and officers
typically require a warrant before opening sealed letters.115 “Using the letter
analogy to question a sender’s reasonable expectation of privacy, while
simultaneously denying these additional protections, highly diminishes privacy
expectations in sending a text message compared with sending a letter.”116
Courts are therefore reluctant to extend to text messages the full privacy
protections that are afforded by the doctrine they have analogized.
While highly informative and well-researched, Ms. O’Connor’s note
contained a significant inaccuracy worth emphasizing. When asserting that
courts generally agree that text message senders have no privacy expectation,
she only cited case law analyzing text messages sent via devices other than cell
phones.117 Ms. O’Connor’s rationale, while valid, is misleading due to her
failure to distinguish text messages sent via cell phones—the focus of her
note—from text messages sent via pagers or emails.118
Although pertaining to pager messages, Quon is nonetheless significant for
the purposes of this Note in that the Court did not actually make a decision
regarding whether a text message sender had Fourth Amendment protections in
a context outside of the workplace.119 Given that all of the case law before
Quon held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in sent text
messages via pager, the Court’s reluctance to do so in this case suggests that
technological advancement has caused the Court to consider reexamining the
letter analogy’s extension to mobile communication in the twenty-first century.
Unlike the third-party doctrine and the letter analogy, the exigent
circumstances doctrine would likely not play a role in the analysis of privacy
expectations of text message senders. While cellular service providers keep
permanent records of calls, they typically store the contents of text messages
for only two weeks before deleting them.120 “[I]f text messages are, in fact,

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 703 n.143 (citing United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir.
2007) (regarding sent emails); United States v. Jones, 149 F. App’x 954, 959 (11th Cir. 2005)
(regarding sent text messages between pagers); United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d
Cir. 2004) (regarding sent emails); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (regarding
sent emails)). Ms. O’Connor is not alone in grouping text messages from cell phones together
with those of pagers. See also Miller, supra note 97, at § 5.
118. O’Connor, supra note 2, at 703 n.143.
119. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2633 (2010) (“Petitioners and
respondents disagree whether a sender of a text message can have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a message he knowingly sends to someone’s employer-provided pager. It is not
necessary to resolve this question in order to dispose of the case, however.”).
120. Orso, supra note 40, at 199 (citing Mike Wendland, Mayor’s Texts Weren’t Private, but
Yours Probably Are, USA TODAY (Jan. 24, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/200801-24-detroit-texts_N.htm (in which a Sprint spokesman stated that text messages are stored for
about two weeks according to standard practice in the industry)).
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saved for roughly two weeks, then it leaves officers more than adequate time to
obtain a warrant and serve it upon the cellular company.”121 Therefore, it
appears that text messages sent through cellular providers do not create a “now
or never” situation in which exigent circumstances would apply.122
Finally, it is worth noting that privacy expectations of text messages could
potentially be analyzed under the Stored Communications Act (SCA).123 While
Congress enacted the law in 1986 in light of the Fourth Amendment’s
inadequacies, the SCA’s categorization of electronic information has since
become outdated and has caused lower courts to wrestle with the issue.124
Moreover, the SCA “offers no suppression for criminal defendants,”125 making
it inapplicable in Hinton. Congress may soon revise the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, however, which includes the SCA.126 Courts
considering privacy expectations of text-message senders ought to be mindful
of the SCA, should it be updated.
II. STATE V. HINTON
Equipped with a general comprehension of the status of cell phones, text
messages, and Fourth Amendment privacy analysis, one can better understand
the issues in Hinton. This section first establishes the significant facts of the
case and then summarizes the differing opinions of the majority and the
dissent. The majority, authored by Judge Joel Penoyer, applied both the thirdparty doctrine and the letter analogy, and it held that Hinton had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the text messages he sent. The dissent, written by
Judge Marywave Van Deren asserted that Hinton’s communication carried
Fourth Amendment protections.
A.

Summary of Facts

In 2009, officers who worked with Detective Kevin Sawyer gave him an
iPhone they had acquired from Daniel Lee, a suspected drug dealer who had
been arrested earlier that day.127 While Lee’s phone was in Detective Sawyer’s

121. Id.
122. Id. at 200 (citing Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973)). However, text
messages sent through other means could very well create such a “now or never” situation. See
infra Part II.C.
123. See O’Connor, supra note 2, at 690 (citing citing Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co.,
Inc., 529 F.3d 892, 903 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom., City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S.
746 (2010)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), ELECTRONIC INFO. PRIVACY CTR.,
http://epic.org/privacy/ecpa/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
127. State v. Hinton, 280 P.3d 476, 477–78 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d en banc on other
grounds, No. 87663-1, 2014 WL 766680 (Wash. Feb. 27, 2014).
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possession, Lee received a text message from Shawn Hinton, whom Detective
Sawyer knew from past arrests.128 The text message, appearing on the
smartphone’s home screen, read: “Hey whats [sic] up dogg [sic] can you call
me i [sic] need to talk to you.”129 Detective Sawyer, impersonating Lee, replied
to Hinton’s text message.130 Detective Sawyer and Hinton then exchanged
several text messages, during which a drug transaction was arranged in a
parking lot.131 Based on this text message conversation and the arranged drug
transaction, Detective Sawyer arrested Hinton in the parking lot.132 After the
arrest, Detective Sawyer called Hinton’s purported number, and Hinton’s cell
phone rang, which proved that the text messages had indeed come from
Hinton’s phone.133
Hinton was later tried for attempted possession of heroin.134 Hinton filed a
motion to suppress “any and all evidence obtained as a result of the search of a
cell phone taken from Daniel Lee,” arguing that Detective Sawyer had violated
Hinton’s Fourth Amendment rights.135 The State asserted that Hinton “did not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the text messages.”136 Denying
Hinton’s motion to dismiss, the trial court stated:
[T]here is no expectation of privacy in a communication transmitted to a
device such as an iPhone . . . . Whoever is sending a text message does not
know who is observing the message. The sender of a text message makes an
assumption that the message will be received by the person intended. The
137
communication is not rendered private based on that assumption.

128. Id. at 478.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. “The following text message exchange occurred:”
[Saywer]: Can’t now. What’s up?
....
[Hinton]: I need to talk to you about business. Please call when you get a chance.
....
[Sawyer]: I’m about to drop off my last.
....
[Hinton]: Please save me a ball. Please? I need it. I’m sick.
Id.
132. Hinton, 280 P.3d at 478.
133. Id. The court noted that “[t]o discover the phone number associated with Z–Shawn
Hinton, Sawyer had to navigate to the contacts folder on Lee’s iPhone. It is unclear from the
record when Sawyer accessed the contacts folder to retrieve Hinton’s phone number.” Id. at 478
n.4.
134. Id. at 478.
135. Id. Hinton also argued that the detective had violated the Washington Constitution
through his actions. Id.
136. Id.
137. Hinton, 280 P.3d at 478 (internal citation omitted).
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The trial court convicted Hinton for attempted possession of heroin, and
Hinton appealed.138
B.

Majority Opinion

The majority briefly addressed the conversation between Detective Sawyer
and Hinton.139 The majority analogized the case to Washington State v.
Goucher, wherein a police detective answered a suspect’s telephone while
executing a search warrant at the suspect’s house.140 By intercepting the phone
call and saying he “was handling business,” the detective told the caller to
come over and subsequently arrested him for drug possession.141 The Goucher
court held that a caller “has no reasonable expectation of privacy when he
‘voluntarily expose[s] his desire to buy drugs to someone he did not know.’”142
The majority also cited United States v. Passarella, in which “callers made
incriminating statements about the sale of drugs” under a belief that an agent
with a warrant on the other end of the conversation was the defendant.143 In
Passarella, the Sixth Circuit held that the phone conversation was properly
admitted into evidence.144 The Hinton majority implied that the exchange
between Hinton and Detective Sawyer via text message is equivalent to the
phone conversations in Goucher and Passarella and that Hinton, therefore, had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation under the Fourth
Amendment.145 Moreover, the majority asserted in a footnote that whether or
not Lee’s phone was properly seized was not at issue.146
The majority also applied the third-party doctrine to the facts in Hinton,
noting that “the Court ‘consistently has held that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.’”147 The majority asserted that the Fourth Amendment therefore “does
not protect Hinton’s ‘misplaced trust that the message actually would reach the
intended recipient.’”148

138. Id.
139. Id. at 480–81. In addition to analyzing the issue under the Fourth Amendment, both the
majority and dissenting opinions included analysis of the issue under Washington’s state
constitution as well. Id. at 479; id. at 484–85 (Van Deren, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 480–81 (majority opinion) (citing State v. Goucher, 881 P.2d 210 (Wash. 1994)).
141. Id. at 481 (quoting Goucher, 881 P.2d at 211).
142. Hinton, 280 P.3d at 481 (quoting Goucher, 881 P.2d at 213).
143. Id. (citing United States v. Passarella, 788 F.2d 377, 378 (6th Cir. 1986)).
144. Id. at 481–82.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 478 n.2.
147. Hinton, 280 P.3d at 481 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)).
148. Id. at 482 (quoting Washington v. Wojtyna, 855 P.2d 315, 318 (1993) (quoting United
States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 1990))).
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While analyzing Hinton’s claims under the third-party doctrine, the
majority analogized cell phones to pagers.149 Adopting the Sixth Circuit’s
rationale, the majority held than when an agent seizes a pager pursuant to an
arrest and calls the incoming number to arrange a drug transaction, the
individual who sent the incoming number has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in that message.150 The majority repeatedly emphasized that, like a
pager, Lee’s iPhone could have been in anyone’s possession.151 Moreover, the
sender risks that the recipient, whether the intended person or not, can disclose
the contents of the message by forwarding it to others.152 Maintaining the
analogy to pagers, the majority rejected Hinton’s argument that a cell phone is
more technologically advanced than a pager and therefore ought to be analyzed
differently.153 Hinton asserted that, because cell phones are now capable of
computer-like functionality, sending a message to such a device carries with it
a greater expectation of privacy than sending a message to a “less sophisticated
device like a pager.”154 The majority, however, held that “it is the individual’s
decision to transmit a message to an electronic device that could be in
anybody’s possession—and not the receiving device’s level of technological
complexity—that defeats the individual’s expectation of privacy in that
communication.”155
Additionally, the majority also analogized cell phones to letters, noting that
“[c]ase law has consistently applied the standard for letters to new
technology.”156 Such precedent dictates that any privacy expectation one has in
a sent letter terminates upon delivery, even if the sender orders the recipient to
keep it private.157 The majority “decline[d] to offer communication made using
a technological device more privacy protections than have been provided for
letters, one of the most traditional form [sic] of communication.”158

149. See id. at 481.
150. Id. (citing Meriwether, 917 F.2d at 957–58).
151. See id. at 482.
152. Hinton, 280 P.3d at 482. “By [transmitting messages to a device over which he had no
control, Hinton] voluntarily ran the risk that his messages, once delivered, would be received by
whomever possessed the iPhone, and he had no control over what that person might do with that
message.” Id. at 480.
153. Id. at 482.
154. Id.
155. Id. (citing Meriwether, 917 F.2d at 959) (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 484 (citing United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (extending
the letter doctrine to email); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (extending the letter
doctrine to email); United States v. Dupree, 781 F. Supp. 2d. 115, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(extending the letter doctrine to email)).
157. Hinton, 280 P.3d at 483–84 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984);
United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1195–96 (6th Cir. 1995)).
158. Id. at 484.
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Reinforcing its analogies to letters and pagers, the majority distinguished
text messages from phone calls by focusing on the inability to discern with
whom one is communicating via text message.159 “Unlike the phone
conversation where a caller can hear a voice and decide whether to converse,
one who sends a message to a pager has no external indicia that the message
actually is received by the intended recipient.”160 Given this lack of
identification indicators, “[a] party sending a message to a pager has expressed
his subjective desire to preserve his privacy even less than in the telephone
situation.”161 The majority implied that this assertion also extends to cell
phones due to the court’s refusal to distinguish pagers from cell phones in its
analysis.162
To summarize, the majority held that Hinton had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the text message conversation he engaged in with Detective
Sawyer when he believed he was communicating with Lee. Moreover, the
majority found that Hinton had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his first
message under both the third-party doctrine and the letter analogy.
C. Dissenting Opinion
Unlike the majority, the dissent asserted that Hinton’s conversation with
Detective Sawyer was protected under the Fourth Amendment. More so than
the majority, the dissent emphasized that Detective Sawyer not only read
Hinton’s text message but also conversed with him via text message.163
“Sawyer engaged in a continuing search when he . . . used Lee’s iPhone to
send and receive messages from Hinton.”164 The dissent contended that a
“[p]hysically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than [a] purely
visual inspection.”165 Since the back-and-forth conversation required more than
a visual inspection, the dissent asserted, Hinton reasonably expected that he
was texting Lee and not a government official representing himself as Lee.166
The dissent also challenged the majority’s analogy to Goucher by recognizing

159. Id. at 482.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Hinton, 280 P.3d at 482.
163. Id. at 484 (Van Deren, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that Detective Sawyer “did
more than ‘simply read the text messages [from Shawn Hinton] after they were delivered to the
intended recipient.” Id. (citing id. at 483 (majority opinion)).
164. Id. (Van Deren, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 488 (quoting Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000)).
166. Id. at 489.
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that the defendant in that case conversed “with an acknowledged stranger,”167
while Hinton “communicated with an officer pretending to be Lee.”168
Turning its attention to Detective Sawyer’s initial search of Hinton’s text
message, the dissent contended that the third-party doctrine should not apply to
text messages due to the authority of Smith, Quon, and Jones.169 Quoting
Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion in Smith, the Hinton dissent asserted that
“[t]hose who disclose certain facts to a . . . phone company for a limited
business purpose need not assume that this information will be released to
other persons for other purposes.”170 Additionally, the Quon Court noted the
pervasiveness of text-message communications, suggesting that a reasonable
expectation of privacy in text messages exists outside the workplace.171 The
dissent also emphasized Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones, in
which she stated that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties . . . [, as t]his approach is ill suited to the digital
age.”172 The dissent shared Justice Sotomayor’s assertion that even if a text
message is knowingly communicated to a third party, such as a cellular
network, the ubiquitous nature of today’s technological society requires that it
still retain Fourth Amendment protection.173 Thus, the dissent strongly
indicated that recent Supreme Court opinions conflict with the majority’s
reasoning.
The dissent further challenged the third-party doctrine’s application to text
messages by noting how often individuals are in possession of their own
phones and how often they engage in text messaging.174 “[M]any, if not most,
mobile phone owners are in immediate possession of their phones at all
times.”175 By exceeding phone calls, the dissent stated, texting “has become
the predominant form of communication.”176 These findings substantially

167. Hinton, 280 P.3d at 486–87 (Van Deren, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Goucher, 881
P.2d 210, 213 (Wash. 1994)).
168. Id. at 487.
169. See id. at 487–89.
170. Id. at 487 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall J.,
dissenting)).
171. Id. (quoting City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010)). “Cell phone
and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be
essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification.” Id.
172. Hinton, 280 P.3d at 489 (Van Deren, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Jones, 132
S.Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted)).
173. See id.
174. Id. at 489–90.
175. Id. at 489.
176. Id. at 490 (emphasis added). Moreover, “[t]ext-message use is expected to continue to
surge. ‘One study estimated that there were 5 trillion SMS texts sent worldwide in 2009 and that
there will be more than 10 trillion SMS texts sent worldwide in 2013.’” Id. at 490 n.17 (internal
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support a person’s expectation “that the phone’s owner will be the immediate
recipient of the message and, thus, the sender can expect that the message will
remain private absent voluntary action by the phone’s, [sic] owner to disclose
the contents of the text message.”177 Given the popularity of text messaging
and the immediate accessibility of cell phones, the dissent argued that “[c]ourts
must analyze new forms of communication within the context of our society’s
evolving and existing expectations of privacy.”178 Taken together, these points
demonstrated the dissent’s determination that society has reached a point in
which it recognizes that all text messages, both sent and received, have an
expectation of remaining private.
The dissent directly, albeit briefly, distinguished text messages from
letters. In a footnote, the dissent declared the letter analogy “unworkable in the
electronic communication context because electronic messages are delivered
nearly instantaneously and thus, would leave the sender of electronic
communications with no expectation of privacy.”179
The dissent completed its rejection of the majority’s device analogies and
distinctions by asserting that text messages are more private than phone calls
rather than less so.180 In response to the majority’s argument that a person
cannot confirm another’s identity through text messages, the dissent
emphasized that “oral conversations can be overheard . . . [while] text
messages are insulated from the accidental or deliberate eavesdropper unless
the eavesdropper possesses the receiving phone.”181 Due to the significant
unlikelihood of eavesdropping, text message senders therefore expect a greater
degree of privacy.182 By rejecting the third-party doctrine application,
distinguishing text messages from letters, and highlighting the improbability of
eavesdropping, the dissent concluded that sent text messages deserve privacy
expectations.

citation omitted). Many Americans not only text “information that formerly would have been the
subject of an oral telephone conversation,” but they utilize text messaging more than phone calls.
Id. at 490 (citing Marguerite Reardon, Americans Text More Than They Talk, CNET (Sept. 22,
2008), http://tiny.cc/CNET).
177. Hinton, 280 P.3d at 489 (Van Deren, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 490–91 (noting the Quon Court’s acknowledgement that “[r]apid changes in the
dynamics of communication and information transmission are evident not just in the technology
itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior”) (quoting City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130
S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010)).
179. Id. at 490 n.20.
180. Id. at 489–90.
181. Id. (citing O’Connor, supra note 2, at 713).
182. Hinton, 280 P.3d at 489–90 (Van Deren, J., dissenting).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2014]

TEXT ME, MAYBE?

1133

III. ANALYSIS
This section begins with an analysis as to whether the conversation
between Detective Sawyer and Hinton violated Hinton’s Fourth Amendment
rights. This section then turns to the primary issue in the majority and dissent:
whether Hinton possessed constitutional protections over Hinton’s initial text
message sent to Lee. Finally, after applying the law to the unique facts
provided in Hinton, this section concludes with an examination of recent
advancements in text message communications and ways in which these
changes would alter a Fourth Amendment analysis.
A.

The Legality of the Conversation Between Detective Sawyer and Hinton

Detective Sawyer’s back-and-forth conversation via text message provides
a unique set of significant facts that the Court may consider when it hears a
similar case. As the dissent highlights, Detective Sawyer not only searched
through Lee’s phone but also conversed with Hinton through text messaging
while posing as Lee.183 To this point, the dissent’s application of Jones appears
valid. In Jones, the Court held that attaching a device to the exterior of a car
constitutes a search in part because “the officers ‘did more than conduct a
visual inspection of respondent’s vehicle.’”184 Likewise, the conversation
Detective Sawyer instigated plainly constituted a “[p]hysically invasive
inspection . . . more intrusive than purely visual inspection.”185 Therefore,
applying language from Jones, the Court could determine that actions similar
to those of Detective Sawyer are unlawful. On the other hand, Justice Scalia
would likely distinguish Hinton’s situation from that in Jones; in Hinton, the
property being trespassed, Lee’s iPhone, did not belong to Hinton.186 Justice
Scalia would consider the extent of a search like Detective Sawyer’s
insignificant because under his prioritization of the trespass doctrine, which
provides that physical intrusion into a person’s property is required for an
action to constitute a Fourth Amendment search, none of Hinton’s rights would
have been violated by the search.187
Whether it applies Jones or not, it is more probable that the Court would
recognize the misplaced trust doctrine as the more applicable doctrine.188
While it is accurate that Hinton displayed misplaced trust when texting
Detective Sawyer, however, the White Court’s determination that “one
contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may

183. Id. at 484.
184. Id. at 488 (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012) (internal citation
omitted)).
185. Id. at 488 (quoting Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000)).
186. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278–79 (1983)).
187. See id.
188. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
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be reporting to the police”189 does not neatly fit into Hinton’s situation. It was
not the case that Hinton’s trust in Lee was betrayed or that Lee was an
undercover officer.190 Moreover, lower court holdings under White’s precedent
do not fully extend to Hinton’s situation either. In Goucher, the defendant
conversed with “an acknowledged stranger.”191 Unlike in Goucher, here,
Hinton conversed with Detective Sawyer posing as Lee.192 Furthermore, Lee
did not consent to Detective Sawyer’s interjection into the conversation.193 In
other words, Hinton’s misplaced trust was not in his accomplice Lee but rather
in his means of communication. By choosing to communicate with Lee via text
message instead of by phone, Hinton prevented himself from observing any
external indicia that Lee was indeed the individual on the other end of the
conversation.194 Therefore, if the Court were to determine that the misplaced
doctrine applies, it would extend the doctrine beyond the already-extended
boundaries adopted by lower courts. By choosing not to apply the doctrine,
however, the Court would effectively construct a new limit to its application
that had not yet been considered by lower courts. Consequently, since any
determination as to the application of the misplaced trust doctrine would alter
the doctrine in ways not yet reviewed by lower courts, it is most likely that the
Court would explore alternative doctrines to determine whether the ensuing
text message conversation violated Hinton’s constitutional rights.

189. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
190. See Hinton, 280 P.3d at 477 (acknowledging that Detective Sawyer acquired Lee’s
phone and posed as Lee while texting Hinton).
191. State v. Goucher, 881 P.2d 210, 213 (Wash. 1994). See also United States v. Seinfeld,
632 F. Supp 622, 626 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that a reasonable expectation of privacy did not
exist when an agent told the caller-defendant that he was speaking to an employee of the phone’s
owner rather than posing as the owner himself); United States v. Congote, 656 F.2d 971, 976 (5th
Cir. 1981) (holding that a reasonable expectation of privacy did not exist when “[n]one of the
agents pretended to be . . . the party [whom] appellant wished to reach”). But see United States v.
Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1437 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that requiring all undercover agents to
identify themselves would effectively end undercover operations). Hinton is also distinguishable
from Passarella, which the majority cited, because in that case it was the phone’s owner rather
than the caller who raised Fourth Amendment claims. United States v. Passarella, 788 F.2d 377,
378 (6th. Cir. 1986).
192. Compare Hinton, 280 P.3d at 477 (noting that Detective Sawyer posed as Lee), with
Goucher, 881 P.2d at 213 (noting that detective’s “conversation was with an acknowledged
stranger”).
193. Hinton, 280 P.3d at 478; see also United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 710, 713 (9th
Cir. 2004) (holding that an individual had no Fourth Amendment privacy protections over online
chatroom communications made to an agent posing as a minor because the minor and his father
consented to the agent’s interjection into the conversation). It is worth noting that if Lee
consented to the search of the phone, Detective Sawyer’s interjection into the conversation may
nonetheless have exceeded the scope of Lee’s consent. See U.S. v. Lopez-Cruz, 730 F.3d 803,
809 (9th Cir. 2013).
194. Hinton, 280 P.3d at 482.
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Should the Court analyze such a case under Jones and disregard any
applicability of the misplaced trust doctrine, the Court could hold that a
conversation like the one between Detective Sawyer and Hinton would violate
the defendant’s constitutional rights. Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the trespass
doctrine, however, could undermine the defendant’s privacy expectations in
another device. By way of the exclusionary rule and the poisonous tree
doctrine,195 the defendant could then move to suppress the information
obtained by the unlawful search. However, such an application of Jones would
effectively swallow the misplaced trust doctrine, as any interjection by legal
enforcement officials into a conversation is more invasive than a merely visual
inspection. Therefore, in order to avoid making such sweeping decisions, it is
likely that the Court would reach its holding by solely analyzing the search of
the defendant’s initial text message.196
B.

The Legality of Detective Sawyer’s Initial Search of Hinton’s Sent Text
Message

Recognizing that an analysis of the ensuing conversation like the one
between Detective Sawyer and Hinton would result in far-reaching
determinations, the Court’s holding would likely pertain to the initial search.197
Additionally, an analysis of the initial search would be more relevant to the
typical instance in which an officer searches a person’s cell phone in order to
access a third party’s sent text message.198 Below is an exploration of Hinton’s
claims under the Katz test, followed by the Court’s probable analysis of such
facts under the third-party doctrine and letter analogy.199

195. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
196. It appears that Hinton’s allegations focused primarily on this initial search. See Hinton,
280 P.3d at 478–79 (“[Hinton] argues that when Sawyer read Hinton’s text message . . . Sawyer
conducted a search that violated . . . the Fourth Amendment. He asserts, therefore, that the trial
court should have suppressed . . . ‘the officer’s communications with [Hinton], as well as the
presence of [Hinton] at the fake drug sale the officer arranged.’”) (quoting Brief of Appellant at
*16, Hinton, 280 P.3d 476 (No. 41014-1-II)).
197. See supra Part III.A.
198. See City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2633 (2010).
199. Before delving into the analysis, it is worth noting the apparent applicability and
conclusiveness of the plain view doctrine, which allows an officer to seize an item not described
in a warrant if the item is in “plain view” from the officer’s position. See Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990). After all, Detective Sawyer was already in possession of Lee’s phone
when Hinton’s text message appeared in its entirety on Lee’s iPhone. Hinton, 280 P.3d at 478.
However, technicalities and policy rationale complicate this doctrine’s application. The doctrine
“deals only with those circumstances where an officer has already justifiably intruded into a
constitutionally-protected area, spots and then removes incriminating evidence. It refers only to
seizures but not to searches.” Howard E. Wallin, Plain View Revisited, 22 PACE L. REV. 307, 325
(2002); United States v. Miller, 769 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir. 1985). The plain view doctrine does
not apply in Hinton’s case because Detective Sawyer’s observation of the text message appearing
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Katz Requirements

While neither opinion in Hinton made any reference to Katz, the Court
would likely do so in order to establish a prima facie case under the Fourth
Amendment. In order to meet the Katz test, a defendant in Hinton’s position
must meet the following requirements: (1) he must have had a subjective
expectation of privacy in his sent text messages, and (2) this expectation must
be shared by society.200 The first, subjective prong of the test would likely be
assumed, as the Court “appears to have eliminated the subjective component of
the Katz test.”201

on the screen did not constitute a seizure. See Hinton, 280 P.3d at 477–78. While the Court could
appropriately find that Detective Sawyer’s search was lawful because a search in plain view does
not constitute an invasion of privacy, no court has addressed the plain view doctrine as it pertains
to the privacy rights of the individual on the opposite end of a conversation. See, e.g., United
States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (holding that an agent’s
observation of a caller’s name on an individual’s cell phone did not violate the cell phone owner’s
privacy rights). Furthermore, Detective Sawyer’s seizure of Lee’s phone presents problems as
well. Because the legal justification for Detective Sawyer’s warrantless seizure was never
established, Hinton, 280 P.3d at. 277–78 & n.2, and the Supreme Court has not yet decided on the
constitutionality of searching an arrestee’s cell phone as incidental to an arrest, see supra notes
84–88 and accompanying text, the Court would have to decide a contentious issue merely to find
that an officer like Detective Sawyer “already justifiably intruded into a constitutionally-protected
area.” See Wallin, supra. Therefore, like with the misplaced trust doctrine, the Court would likely
avoid the plain view doctrine to prevent a far-reaching determination.
200. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. An intertwined but separate analysis that the
Court could consider is whether or not a defendant like Hinton had standing to allege his claims.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text. The Court could compare the defendant’s privacy
expectations to those in Rakas, finding that a text message sender’s privacy expectations in
another’s cellular device are as unfounded as an automobile passenger’s privacy expectations in
that vehicle’s glove compartment. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148–49 (1978). After all,
protecting such privacy expectations of sent text messages could allow the potentially thousands
of contacts engaging in text message conversations with the cell phone’s owner to claim that the
searching officer violated their Fourth Amendment rights. “A person who is aggrieved by an
illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search
of a third person’s premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights
infringed.” Id. at 134 (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). However, the
Rakas Court recognized that conversations, in addition to possessory interests, constitute a
privacy expectation sufficient for standing. Id. at 136 (stating that parties to unlawfully overheard
conversations have standing under the Fourth Amendment). Therefore, the Court could
appropriately find that, like in Katz, the defendant communicated in a way that “entitled [him] to
assume that the words he [communicated would] not be broadcast to the world.” See id. at 149
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967)). See also infra notes 239–40 and
accompanying text. Finally, it is worth noting that while standing was not discussed by the
Washington Court of Appeals or analyzed in the parties’ briefs, it appears that the trial court
determined that Hinton had standing. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 196, at *7–8 (stating the
trial court held that Hinton had neither automatic standing nor general standing).
201. Jones, supra note 69, at 935 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1984)). See also supra note 68–69 and accompanying text.
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The next question to consider is whether or not this expectation of privacy
over sent text messages is “shared by society.” As studies have indicated,
people consider their cell phones to be at least as private of a device as a
computer, if not more so.202 Other than contact information, text messages are
the most commonly stored items on a phone.203 Additionally, text messages are
becoming the most popular mode of communication.204 As Smith indicates,
such findings are sufficient to show that society shares an expectation of
privacy in text messages.205
Hinton’s expectation of privacy, however, was narrower than simply his
text messages in general. He expected that the text messages he sent to Lee,
which were saved on Lee’s phone, would be private.206 Research indicates that
the specific question of whether or not society possesses a shared expectation
of privacy in sent text messages stored in another’s device has not yet been
analyzed by case law, nor has it been researched in any studies. Still, it is
possible to develop an answer to this question by considering a variety of
different, but related, studies. Because cell phones are practically always
attached to one’s person,207 it is reasonable to think that the recipient is
carrying the phone when the message is sent. Moreover, people are reluctant to
give others access to their cell phones.208 If the average person is in nearconstant possession of her cell phone and does not let others use it, there is a
low probability that another person will view her text messages. Considering
these findings, it is likely that these sent text messages are not exposed to third
parties when they are sent.
202. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
205. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979). “Although subjective expectations
cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these
circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.” Id.
The fact that the Court thought to consider if scientific studies could measure expectations
strongly indicates that it would be a sufficient indicator in the Katz analysis.
206. See State v. Hinton, 280 P.3d 476, 483 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d en banc on other
grounds, No. 87663-1, 2014 WL 766680 (Wash. Feb. 27, 2014) (“That an individual may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in certain contents of his or her own cell phone, including the
sent and received text messages that are stored on the phone, is simply not at issue here.”).
207. See id. at 489 (Van Deren, J., dissenting) (“[M]any, if not most, mobile phone owners
are in immediate possession of their phones at all times.”).
208. Urban et al., supra note 27, at 11–13. Ninety percent of cell phone owners in the survey
stated they would “definitely not allow” strangers to borrow their phones. Id. at 12. Only half of
cell phone owners stated they would “definitely allow” a spouse or close family member to
borrow the phone. Id. Importantly, the phrasing of the survey question highlighted that the cell
phone would be borrowed with the person’s knowledge and permission. Id. Moreover, when
asked why they would not allow others to borrow their phones, most responses contained
concerns about privacy. Id. at 12–13. Four percent even specified their concern that the borrower
would look through emails, texts, pictures, or contacts. Id. at 13.
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Furthermore, the Court would merely consider whether the shared
expectation exists, not whether such expectation is reasonable.209 The Court
need look no further than the judicial system to identify such an expectation, as
the sharing of intimate text messages is common in divorce litigation.210 “More
than 90% of America’s top divorce attorneys said they have seen a spike in the
number of cases using evidence from smartphones in the past three years.”211
These numbers strongly suggest an expectation among society that text
messages are a safe mode of communication for highly private affairs, even
though such messages are often used as evidence in litigation. Such evidence
would indicate to the Court that, whether reasonable or not, society shares an
expectation that sent text messages will be kept private.
Based on the aforementioned studies and cases, the Court should find that
privacy expectations over sent text messages, even if stored in another’s
device, are constitutionally protected under Katz. The Court would assume that
a defendant like Hinton had a subjective expectation of privacy—if it even
considered that factor—and it would hold that the defendant’s expectation of
privacy is one shared by society because studies suggest the intended recipient
will read the sent text message. As the following paragraphs examine,
however, the exceptions under Katz as applied to the facts set forth in Hinton
require further analysis.
2.

The Third-Party Doctrine

While Hinton’s claims would presumably meet the Katz test, an
application of the third-party doctrine would be problematic for the defendant
in a number of ways. As the underlying facts occurred in 2009, and iMessage
was not released until 2011,212 Hinton’s text message must have been sent
through a cellular carrier in order to reach Lee’s iPhone. Consequently, the
content of the message would be disclosed to the third-party cellular carriers
and, under Smith, such disclosure would undermine any Fourth Amendment

209. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
210. Patricia Reaney, Be Careful What You Text If You’re Heading for Divorce, REUTERS
(Feb 20, 2012, 10:02 AM) [hereinafter Reaney 1], http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/20/usdivorce-texting-idUSTRE81J0V020120220. Additionally, the prevalence of “sexting” suggests
that “texters” think they are communicating with the intended people. Roughly 30% of U.S.
teenagers reportedly “sext,” or send text messages containing nude photos. Patricia Reaney,
Sexting Common Behavior Among U.S. Teens—Study, REUTERS (Jul. 2, 2012, 4:23 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/02/sexting-teens-study-idUSL2E8I26PF20120702.
211. Reaney 1, supra note 210.
212. See Don Reisinger, Apple Unveils iCloud, Shows Off Features of Lion, iOS 5, CNET
(June 6, 2011, 12:02 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13506_3-20069336-17/apple-unveilsicloud-shows-off-features-of-lion-ios-5/ (“Apple showed off a new feature, called iMessage,
allowing iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch users to send text messages, videos, photos, and more to
each other.”).
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protections.213 Therefore, if it applies the third party doctrine, the Court would
likely hold that the defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in the sent
text message.
The Court could, however, use cases like Hinton as an opportunity to adopt
Justice Sotomayor’s assertion that the third-party doctrine is not workable in
today’s technology-dependent society. As the Hinton dissent highlighted,
Sotomayor declared the doctrine “ill suited to the digital age, in which people
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the
course of carrying out mundane tasks.”214 While no other justice joined in
Sotomayor’s concurrence, it is possible that a majority of the Court agrees with
her contention that the third-party doctrine ought to be rethought in light of
advancing technology. Moreover, as Ms. O’Connor and the Hinton dissent
both indicate, the Court may turn to the rationale found in the Smith dissent to
determine that technological complexity and the vast amounts of information
stored in cell phones have rendered the doctrine ineffective.215
In addition to the third-party disclosure that occurs when text messages are
sent, the possibility of intentional disclosure might also factor into the Court’s
application of the third-party doctrine. Although studies suggest that the
intended recipient accesses the device at the time a text message is sent, no
studies have examined the likelihood that the intended recipient will refrain
from disclosing the contents of that message to a third party. One can disclose
the contents of received text messages in numerous ways,216 but there are
currently no studies pertaining to the prominence of such actions.
Nevertheless, as the majority recognizes, the mere possibility of intentional
disclosure may be sufficient for the Court to find that there is no expectation of
privacy for sent text messages.217 The majority’s refusal to distinguish text
messages from pager messages218 is concerning on this point, however,
because text messages can include images, audio, and even video.219 The
ability to converse through a variety of formats allows “texters” to “record

213. See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text; State v. Hinton, 280 P.3d 476, 487
(Wash. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d en banc on other grounds, No. 87663-1, 2014 WL 766680 (Wash.
Feb. 27, 2014) (Van Deren, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
216. On an iPhone, one can: directly forward a text message; copy and paste the text
message’s contents into another text conversation; share its contents with people nearby by
reading it aloud or allowing others to read it; or take a screenshot of the conversation and send
that image to a third party or post it on the internet.
217. See supra notes 151–155 and accompanying text.
218. See id.
219. See supra note 37.
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their most private thoughts and conversations.”220 Moreover, text messages
allow more characters per message than do pager messages, allowing for
deeper conversations.221 Considering that cell phone text messages lend
themselves to more private conversations, it is less likely that one would
intentionally disclose their contents. Therefore, if the Court were to determine
that the third-party doctrine does not apply due to advancing technology,
distinguishing text messages sent via cell phones from ones via pager could
further the rationale for such a holding.222
3.

The Letter Analogy

The majority relied extensively on the letter analogy in defeating Hinton’s
claims.223 In order to evade this exception, the Court would need to decide that
text messages should not be analyzed under the doctrine. The dissent
accurately determined the majority’s analysis to be problematic. First, the
majority repeatedly contended that the device to which Hinton was sending
text messages could have been in anyone’s possession.224 As previously stated,
however, studies show that cell phone owners are resistant to let others use
their phones.225 Such resistance indicates a high probability that when someone
sends a text message, the intended recipient will be in possession of the device
and will read it.
The second problem with applying the letter doctrine to text messages is
that the “termination upon delivery” rationale is practically moot.226
Considering, as does Ms. O’Connor, the speed of today’s cell phone networks,
the transmission of a text message is nearly instantaneous.227 This
technological advancement in communication leaves no opportunity to
intercept the message and to prevent it from reaching its destination. This
problem, however, would likely not be significant, as the doctrine’s extension

220. United States v. Park, No. CR 05–375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23,
2007).
221. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; Sam Grobart & Ian Austen, The BlackBerry,
Trying to Avoid the Hall of Fallen Giants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2012, at BU5 (noting that “a
pager message is so tiny that it makes a tweet look like ‘The Iliad’”).
222. It is worth briefly noting that, regardless of the Court’s stance on the third-party doctrine
for text messages, the exigent circumstances doctrine simply does not apply in Hinton. As the
phone network would have saved the content of Hinton’s text message for two weeks, Detective
Sawyer would have had ample opportunity to obtain a warrant to search Hinton’s text message.
Consequently, the Court would not consider this exception. See supra notes 120–121 and
accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 156–162 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 151, 155 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 109–110 and accompanying text.
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to emails and messages via pager have been successful despite the inability to
intercept messages in these instances.228
Finally, and most importantly, the utilization of cell phone text messages
differs greatly from that of the communication methods that currently fall
under the letter doctrine. Today’s smartphones, such as the iPhone owned by
Lee, are not merely advanced pagers but rather computers in the full sense of
the word.229 Unlike emailing or paging, texting “has become the predominant
form of communication.”230 Moreover, the conversational nature and design of
modern text messaging challenges the application of the letter analogy
doctrine.231 The majority failed to recognize that it is not the mere complexity
of the device but rather the way it is used in society that affects its legal
analysis.232 The dissent’s comparison of texting to phone calling reinforces this
conversational aspect by referring to a third party viewing a text message as an
“eavesdropper.”233 This terminology signifies that the third party observes a
glimpse of a conversation rather than merely one message in a series of
exchanged letters. To search a text message is, therefore, more like
eavesdropping on a conversation than inspecting a letter in the mail.
Should the Court address the letter doctrine, it would likely hold that it
does not extend to the uniquely advanced, popular, and conversational
communication of text messaging. “Inevitably, such a dramatic shift will result
in new situations that may implicate a person’s Fourth Amendment right to
protection from unlawful search or seizure. It happened before: with the advent
of the ‘vital role that the public telephone [had] come to play in private
communication . . . .’”234 Considering the vital role text messages now play in
private communications, the Fourth Amendment protections they afford should
be independent of the letter doctrine as well. The Court may therefore refuse to
extend the letter doctrine by finding Hinton’s decision to text Lee analogous to
the decision made in Katz to communicate in an enclosed phone booth. By
sending Lee a text message rather than calling him, Hinton reasonably thought
that his conversation would be excluded from uninvited eavesdroppers.235

228. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 113, 153–155 and accompanying text.
233. See State v. Hinton, 280 P.3d 476, 489–90 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012), rev’d en banc on
other grounds, No. 87663-1, 2014 WL 766680 (Wash. Feb. 27, 2014) (Van Deren, J., dissenting).
234. Monica Mark, GPS Tracking, Smartphones, and the Inadequacy of Jones and Katz, 27
WTR CRIM. JUST. 36, 36 (2013) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967)).
235. See supra notes 111–112, 179–181 and accompanying text.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1142

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1109

C. Future Considerations
As the analysis above illustrates, the Court would likely find that the
original text message of a defendant falls under Fourth Amendment protections
under Katz and that the third-party doctrine is more likely than the letter
doctrine to defeat such protections. However, the Court ought to recognize that
setting such boundaries could set an unworkable precedent. Smartphones have
advanced since Hinton, and that would alter the analysis if such a scenario
were to happen today. First, smartphones can be configured in such a way that,
when a text message is received, the content of the message is not displayed
until the phone is unlocked and the texting application is open.236 Furthermore,
unlocking a smartphone’s home screen can require typing in a password.237
Therefore, even if the phone is in another’s possession when a message is sent,
it is possible that they will not be able to read the content of the message due to
these security features. In such a situation, which was not present in Hinton,
the Court would need to decide whether or not the officer violated the
“texter’s” constitutional rights by unlocking the user’s cell phone without a
warrant in order to read the incoming message. While not as invasive as
engaging in a text message conversation, unlocking a phone in order to read a
text message’s content is significantly more invasive than merely observing
such content as it appears on the phone’s home screen. The Court could
appropriately find, however, that this higher degree of invasion relates only to
the user’s privacy, not the sender’s. So far, courts have only analyzed the cell
phone owner’s rights in such a situation, not the rights of the individual
sending the text message.238
The Court must also consider that advancing technology allows text
messages to be sent over the internet instead of through cellular networks.239 If
a message is sent through Apple’s iMessage service, the content of that
message is not stored on Apple’s servers, and an officer would be unable to
otherwise obtain the message’s content from Apple.240 While iMessage only
works if the text message is sent between Apple devices, the growing
popularity of the iPhone market, as well as the recent decrease of text
messages sent through cellular networks, strongly indicates an increasing
236. See Sharon Vaknin, Five iPhone Tricks to Beef up Your Texting Skills, CNET (May 11,
2012, 3:24 PM), http://bit.ly/J6652n.
237. See Heather Kelly, How to Protect Your Digital Data from a Vengeful Ex, CNN (Feb. 4,
2013, 5:14 PM), http://bit.ly/14CfMCy (noting that 40% of individuals password-protect their
phones in the United States).
238. See Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 1149–50.
239. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
240. Telephone Interview with Senior Technical Advisor, Apple, Inc. (Jan. 26, 2013); see
also Declan McCullagh & Jennifer Van Grove, Apple’s iMessage Encryption Trips up Feds’
Surveillance, CNET (Apr. 4, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57577887-38/
apples-imessage-encryption-trips-up-feds-surveillance/.
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likelihood that a third-party server no longer has access to the contents of a text
message.241 Officers would have an easier time retrieving information from
Facebook, however, as judges have authorized warrants to search individuals’
entire Facebook accounts, including chats.242 Going forward, courts must
recognize that this changing technology may render the third-party doctrine
inapplicable to text message situations because many text messages are not in
fact disclosed to third party servers.
The phenomenon that weakens the application of the third-party doctrine,
however, strengthens the application of the exigent circumstances doctrine. As
more text messages are sent through routes other than cellular networks, there
is no longer an assurance of temporary storage with respect to message
content.243 This changing reality presents a “now or never” situation for
officers in which failure to immediately search or seize could result in a
destruction of the evidence.244 Consequently, advancing technology
strengthens the applicability of the exigent circumstances doctrine while it
weakens that of the third-party doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Considering the popularity of text messaging as a means of communicating
private information, this author concludes that the U.S. Supreme Court would
hold that a defendant like Hinton had a legitimate expectation of privacy under
Katz in the text messages sent to another’s phone and read by an officer.
Moreover, the Court would reject the Hinton majority’s extension of the letter
doctrine to text messages sent via cell phones due to the popularity and
conversational nature of modern text messaging. The Court is more likely,
however, to consider the third-party doctrine as an exception to Katz that
would undermine the defendant’s privacy expectations. If a majority of the
241. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text; see also Mikey Campbell, Apple Sees 2
Billion iMessages Sent Daily from Half a Billion iOS Devices, APPLE INSIDER (Jan. 23, 2013,
3:37 PM), http://bit.ly/W19yKd.
242. Jeff John Roberts, A New U.S. Law-Enforcement Tool: Facebook Searches, REUTERS
(Jul 12, 2011, 11:58 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/12/us-facebook-idUSTRE76B
49420110712.
243. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 81–82, 120–122 and accompanying text. A new smartphone app called
Snapchat allows text messages to be sent and then “self-destruct” a few seconds after the message
has been viewed. Jenna Worthham, A Growing App Lets You See It, Then You Don’t, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2013, at A1. The growing popularity of Snapchat has been noted by Facebook, which has
created its own impermanent messaging app called Poke. Id. In November 2013, Snapchat
rejected a $3 billion acquisition offer from Facebook. Evelyn M. Rusli & Douglas MacMillan,
Snapchat Spurned $3 Billion Acquisition Offer from Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2013, 1:43
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/11/13/snapchat-spurned-3-billion-acquisition-offer-fromfacebook/?mod=WSJ_LatestHeadlines. Impermanent messaging would even further increase an
officer’s sense of urgency to secure the information contained in these messages.
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Court shares Justice Sotomayor’s views as expressed in her Jones concurrence,
the Court could use a case like Hinton to determine that the third-party doctrine
is no longer useful in today’s technological world. If, however, a majority of
the Court disagrees with Justice Sotomayor’s suggestion and focuses instead
on the possibility of intentional disclosure, it would probably find that the
defendant had no Fourth Amendment protections under the third-party
doctrine. Moreover, should the Court recognize recent developments in text
message communications, it would likely disregard the third-party doctrine
altogether but nonetheless find the exigent circumstances determinative
because officers could not access a text message’s content through alternative
means.
Despite the continuing evolution of electronic communication, the Court
cannot ignore that text messaging has come to play a vital role in American
society as a prevalent way to convey private information. The future
undoubtedly promises new and unforeseeable forms of electronic
communication. The ability to turn to a uniform body of law surrounding text
messages would likely save future courts the headache of applying
increasingly obsolete analogies.
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